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Abstract
This paper proposes a novel two-stage defense (NNoculation)
against backdoored neural networks (BadNets) that, unlike ex-
isting defenses, makes minimal assumptions on the shape, size
and location of backdoor triggers and BadNet’s functioning.
In the pre-deployment stage, NNoculation retrains the net-
work using “broad-spectrum" random perturbations of inputs
drawn from a clean validation set to partially reduce the ad-
versarial impact of a backdoor. In the post-deployment stage,
NNoculation detects and quarantines backdoored test inputs
by recording disagreements between the original and pre-
deployment patched networks. A CycleGAN is then trained
to learn transformations between clean validation inputs and
quarantined inputs; i.e., it learns to add triggers to clean vali-
dation images. This transformed set of backdoored validation
images along with their correct labels is used to further retrain
the BadNet, yielding our final defense. NNoculation outper-
forms state-of-the-art defenses NeuralCleanse and Artificial
Brain Simulation (ABS) that we show are ineffective when
their restrictive assumptions are circumvented by the attacker.
1 Introduction
There is a growing concern about the vulnerability of deep
learning, the current state-of-the-art machine learning (ML)
approach, to both test/inference and training time attacks. At
inference time, an attacker can modify the test inputs to an
otherwise benignly trained deep neural network (DNN) so
as to cause mis-classification [5, 7, 8, 12, 15, 18, 25, 30, 37];
the modifications are typically imperceptible or innocuous to
the human eye. Training time attacks, the focus of this paper,
are more pernicious; here the attacker compromises not only
test inputs, but also the DNN training data and/or training
process [9, 16, 27, 34].
DNNs are vulnerable to training time attacks because indi-
vidual users often do not have the computational resources for
training large/complex models (that often comprise millions
of parameters) or the ability to acquire large, high-quality
training datasets required for achieving high accuracy. The
latter is especially true when data acquisition and labeling
entails high cost or requires human expertise [11, 17, 32]; As
a result, users either outsource DNN training or, more com-
monly, source pre-trained DNN models from online repos-
itories like the Model Zoos for different frameworks [2, 4]
or GitHub. While the user can verify a model’s accuracy on
representative inputs by testing on small public or private
validation data, the user may not know or trust the model’s
author (or trainer) or have access to their training data set.
This opens the door to DNN backdooring attacks [9, 16,
27, 34]: an adversary can train and upload a DNN model that
is highly accurate on clean inputs (and thus on the user’s
validation set), but misbehaves when inputs contain special
attacker-chosen backdoor triggers. Such maliciously trained
DNNs have been referred to as “BadNets.” For example, Gu et
al. [16] demonstrated a traffic sign classification BadNet with
state-of-the-art accuracy on regular inputs, but that would clas-
sify any stop sign plastered with a Post-it note as a speed-limit
sign. Similar BadNet attacks can be affected in the context
of publicly available MRI diagnostic models for which train-
ing data is not accessible to the users [41], or state of the art
face recognition models trained on private datasets based on
crowd-sourced human-annotated images [1, 3].
Recent research has sought to address several inter-related
problems for mitigating the BadNet threat, including: (1) how
to ascertain that a DNN is backdoored (e.g., [26]), (2) how
to determine the backdoor trigger(s) an attacker can use to
manipulate the DNN output (e.g., [31, 39]), and (3) how to
remove or disable the backdoor(s) [24]. However, prior ef-
forts have critical shortcomings that restrict their utility and
broader applicability. For example, Artificial Brain Stimula-
tion (ABS) [26] assumes that the presence of a backdoor input
is encoded using a single neuron. The study acknowledges
and we confirm in Section 7 that the defense falters if multi-
ple neurons encode the backdoor. Neural Cleanse [39] makes
a strong assumption that the trigger size is small. Qiao et
al. [31] assume that the trigger size is known to the defender.
Neither assumption is reasonable—attackers are free to select
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the size and shape of the trigger and even use large but seman-
tically meaningful triggers. Sunglasses on human faces [9]
are one such example. In fine-pruning, Liu et al. [24] assume
that clean and backdoored inputs activate different subsets
of neurons. In Section 7, we show that this defense can be
defeated by choosing appropriate attack hyper-parameters. In
this paper, we seek defenses that can patch BadNets making
minimal assumptions about the attacker strategy.
Our defense has the same end-goal as NeuralCleanse and
(implicitly) ABS: we seek to recover the backdoor trigger and
re-train the BadNet with poisoned but correctly labeled data,
thus unlearning bad behaviour. The challenge, however, is
that the attacker has an asymmetric advantage, i.e., she can
pick from the vast space of backdoor patterns as long as they
are not in the defender’s validation dataset of clean inputs.
Existing defenses mitigate this asymmetry by narrowing the
search space of triggers via assumptions, but these (as noted
above) are easily circumvented. However, the defender has a
unique opportunity to level the playing field post deployment.
That is, the inputs to a deployed BadNet (i.e., test inputs in
ML parlance) under attack must contain actual triggers; if the
defender can identify even a fraction of backdoored test inputs,
the search space of triggers can be narrowed considerably.
Based on these observations, we propose NNoculation,
a new, general, end-to-end defense against DNN backdoor-
ing attacks that relaxes the restrictive assumptions in prior
work. Unlike prior work, NNoculation patches BadNets in
two phases: once pre-deployment using clean validation data
(as in prior work), and then again post-deployment by monitor-
ing test inputs. In the pre-deployment defense, NNoculation
avoids making any prior assumptions about the trigger shape,
size or location and instead retrains the BadNet with ran-
domly perturbed validation data (see Section 4.2). We view
this as akin to broad-spectrum inoculation — that is, instead
of defending against specific triggers (or pathogens in this
analogy), we seek robustness against a broad range of untar-
geted perturbations from clean inputs. Our pre-deployment
defense yields a patched DNN that reduces the attack success
rate to between ∼ 2%–∼ 8% on BadNets for which existing
defenses are ineffective.
Post-deployment, we use the patched BadNet from the pre-
vious step to identify possible backdoored inputs (i.e., those
on which the original and patched BadNets differ). These in-
puts are quarantined and, over time, yield a dataset of inputs
containing triggers. We then train a CycleGAN, a powerful
deep learning method that learns to convert images from one
domain to another, to transfer from clean validation to quar-
antined data, teaching the CycleGAN to add triggers to clean
validation data. Thus, we obtain a dataset of backdoored in-
puts with high-quality triggers and their corresponding clean
labels; akin to a narrow-spectrum vaccination against specific
pathogens, we then re-train BadNet using this dataset. Our
final patched BadNet reduces attack success rate down to
0%−2% with minimal loss in classification accuracy.
Contributions Our specific contributions in this paper are:
• We describe and evaluate NNoculation, a novel end-to-
end defense against BadNet attacks that, unlike prior de-
fenses, makes minimal assumptions on the attack modali-
ties including trigger size, shape and location, and impact
of the trigger on the BadNet’s neuronal activations.
• NNoculation is unique in that it patches a BadNet in
two phases: first in the pre-deployment phase using
re-training with random data augmentation (similar to
a broad-spectrum vaccination), and subsequently post-
deployment wherein the deployed DNN is further robus-
tified based on observations of poisoned test data (simi-
lar to a targeted, narrow-spectrum vaccination). To the
best of our knowledge, NNoculation is the first BadNet
defense that proposes an online mechansim to further
improve a patched BadNet in the field.
• Empirical evaluations of NNoculation on semantically
meaningful and challenging triggers for the YouTube
face [40], German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark
(GTSRB) [35] and CIFAR-10 datasets [22] show an
attack success reduction down to∼ 0% with a penalty of
1% ∼ 5% clean accuracy reduction on inoculated DNNs.
• Comparisons of NNoculation with state-of-the-art de-
fenses show that it is the only defense that works compre-
hensively across a range of attacks, while prior defenses
fail completely when their narrow assumptions are vio-
lated. In this light, we also present, in Section 6.3, the
first attack on ABS [26] that makes use of a combination
trigger to circumvent ABS’ restrictive assumptions.
2 Preliminaries
We begin by establishing the notation and terms used in this
work, defining the threat model and security-related metrics.
2.1 Deep Learning
DNN-based Classification A DNN is a parameterized
function, fθ(x), that takes as input a K-dimensional vector,
x ∈ RK (for example, an image re-shaped into a vector) and
outputs z ∈ RM . Here, K and M denote the dimensions of the
input and output, respectively, of the DNN, and θ denotes the
DNN parameters (i.e., weights). Each x has a corresponding
ground-truth label y ∈ [0,M−1], where M is the number of
classes in a dataset. DNNs typically contain multiple layers
of computation organized in a feed-forward fashion where
data flows from the input (or the input layer) to the output
(or the output layer) via several hidden layers. Denoting the
number of layers by L, each layer l ∈ {1, . . . ,L} has Nl neu-
rons, whose outputs are referred to as activations. We express
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the activations of the lth layer as a function of the previous
layer’s activations as follows:
al = φ(wlal−1+bl) ∀l ∈ [1,L−1] (1)
where wl ∈ RNl−1×Nl and bl ∈ RNl are referred to as the
weights and biases, respectively, of the lth layer, and φl :
RNl → RNl is a non-linear function. A commonly used
non-linearity for the hidden layers is the rectified linear
unit (ReLU). z is the output of the Lth layer, i.e., aL = z =
wLaL−1 + bL. For classification, we use a softmax function
σ(z) to produce an M-dimension vector of probability distri-
bution yˆ, where the mth entry of yˆ represents the probability
that x belongs to class m ∈ [0,M−1], i.e. yˆ = σ( fθ(x)). The
inputs for the first layer are the same as the network’s in-
puts, i.e., a0 = x and N0 = K [33]. The network architecture
comprises the number of layers L, the number of neurons
in each layer Nl , and the non-linear activation functions φ.
The learned weights, wl , and biases, bl in Equation 1 together
constitute the DNN parameters θ ∈Θ.
Training the DNN The DNN parameters are learned from
(or trained on) a training dataset Dtr that contains S sam-
ples of labeled data, {xi,yi}Si=1. The training algorithm
train(Dtr,θ,α) takes as input: a training dataset Dtr, an
initial estimate of DNN parameters θ, and training hyper-
parameters. train(·) returns θ∗ such that:
θ∗ = argmin
θ
S
∑
i=1
L (σ( fθ(xi)),yi) (2)
where L is a loss function that can be measured for each
training input as a function of the DNN output and the ground
truth for the particular training input. In practice, θ∗ is ob-
tained using stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithms.
Starting with the initial guess θ0, SGD iteratively computes
the gradient of the loss function in Equation 2 and moves θ
in step sizes proportional to the learning rate α in a direction
away from the gradient. SGD converges once the algorithm
reaches a local minima.
CycleGAN Our solution uses a cycle consistent genera-
tive adversarial network (CycleGAN) [42] to learn image-to-
image mapping functions, where images from one distribution
are transformed into images from another distribution. In this
work, we use similar notation as in [42]. CycleGAN train-
ing uses unpaired collections of images from two different
distributions (or domains) U (domain 1) and V (domain 2).
Given a set of training images drawn from distributionsU and
V , the CycleGAN learns two generator functions for image
translation, namely, G :U→V and F :V →U. The training
process ensures that a domain 1 image, u ∈ U, looks after
transformation, i.e., G(u), like a domain 2 image, and vice-
versa. A CycleGAN imposes a cycle consistency constraint,
which requires that transforming an image from either domain
and transforming back should yield the original image, i.e.,
F(G(u))∼ u for all u ∈U and G(F(v))∼ v for all v ∈ V .
CycleGANs have been successfully used in a variety of
applications [42], for example, photo enhancement, style trans-
fer, colorizing legacy photographs1, etc. As we will see in
Section 4, we will exploit CycleGANs to transform clean
images to their backdoored versions in the on-line phase of
our defense, and use these backdoored versions of the im-
ages to fine-tune the DNN classifier fθ(x) so as to reduce the
adversarial effects of the backdoor.
2.2 Threat Model
We adopt the threat model used in earlier literature [16, 24,
26, 27, 31, 39]. Specifically, we model two parties: a user
(or defender) who wishes to deploy a DNN for a specific
application sourced from an untrusted party, the attacker,
who trains the DNN. We describe below our assumptions
about the two parties’ goals and capabilities.
Attacker Model. Given a DNN application, the
attacker has access to a large and high-quality clean train-
ing dataset, Dcltr drawn from a distribution P cl . Let fθcl de-
note the DNN obtained by benignly training on Dcltr . The
attacker instead seeks to train a BadNet fθbd that agrees
with fθcl on any input x drawn from P cl , but misbehaves
when input x is modified using a trigger insertion function
xp = poison(x). One example of misbehaviour is a targeted
attack where argmax fθbd (x
p) = t where t is an attacker-
chosen class different from the benign DNN’s prediction,
i.e., argmax fθcl (x) = argmax fθcl (x
p) 6= t.
As in prior work [16, 24, 26, 39], the attacker achieves this
goal via training data poisoning. Specifically, the attacker
prepares fθbd by training on both Dcltr and a set of poisoned
inputs, Dbd_ptr which are prepared using the trigger insertion
function poison(·). Specifically, as in [16], the attacker
performs the following three-step training:
1. The attacker prepares Dbd_ptr by applying poison(x)
to a fraction (p%) of Dcltr , e.g., poisoning 10% of Dcltr
produces Dbd_10tr .
2. The attacker trains a model using train(·) with ran-
domly initialized DNN parameters θrand , Dcltr , and α
learning rate. This produces θcl such that fθcl has good
accuracy on data drawn from P cl .
3. The attacker takes θcl and executes train again with
Dbd_ptr and α, thus producing fθbd .
The attacker uploads fθbd to an online repository of DNN
models to coax an unsuspecting user to deploy it. After the
1http://quasimondo.com/
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user deploys the model, the attacker triggers the DNN
misbehavior by providing poisoned test data xp containing
the backdoor trigger. We assume that the attacker is able to
control at least a fraction of test inputs to the deployed model.
User Goals and Capabilities. The user (referred to in-
terchangeably as the defender) wishes to deploy a DNN
for the application advertised by the attacker, but does not
have the resources to acquire a large, high-quality dataset for
it. Instead, the user downloads the DNN, fθbd , uploaded by
the attacker, and uses a small validation dataset, Dclvalid , of
clean inputs to verify the DNN’s accuracy. In addition, the
user seeks to patch fθbd to eliminate backdoors — ideally, the
patched DNN should output correct labels for backdoored
inputs, or detect and refuse to classify them (this is often
referred to in the ML literature as reneging).
To meet these goals, the user has access to two assets
pre-deployment: full, white-box access to fθbd and a small
clean validation dataset Dclvalid . Post-deployment, the user
also has access to all test inputs seen by the deployed model.
As in prior work [26, 39], we do not bound (but will seek to
minimize) the user’s computational effort, i.e., the user’s
primary limitation is the paucity of high-quality training data,
not computational resources.
2.3 Security Metrics
In this work, we evaluate the backdooring and mitigation
successes using the following metrics, evaluated using a held-
out test data Dtest that emulate post-deployment inputs:
Definition 1 (Clean Data Accuracy—CA). Clean Data Ac-
curacy is defined as the percentage of clean test data Dcltest
that is classified as members of their true class.
Definition 2 (Attack Success Rate—ASR). Let DXtest be a set
of test data that are correctly classified as members of their
true class X by fθbd . The Attack Success Rate is the percent-
age of images in DXtest , after poisoning with poison(x), that
are classified by fθbd as members of backdoor target class, T .
Based on Definition 2, an attack fails when a poisoned sam-
ple is classified as anything other than the attacker’s chosen
target class T . Our defense seeks to lower ASR (reducing
power held by attacker) while minimizing impact on CA.
3 Motivations
We are motivated to find ways to relax restrictive assumptions
made by, and limitations of, prior work in BadNet mitigation.
Trigger Nature One line of prior defense methods seeks to
recover the trigger (or trigger distribution) given a BadNet;
the recovered trigger (or distribution) is used (with corrected
Figure 1: An example demonstrating the shortcomings of
NeuralCleanse applied to different BadNets. The leftmost
image is the actual trigger; the other images are incorrectly
reverse-engineered triggers by NeuralCleanse. The top row
corresponds to the reversed trigger on the original BadNet
and the bottom row corresponds to the Variant BadNet.
labels) to re-train the BadNet with the goal of disabling the
backdoor [31,39]. However, these works make strong assump-
tions about the trigger. Neural Cleanse [39] assumes that the
trigger is small; for example, the trigger could be a small fixed
pattern of pixels superimposed in one corner of the image.
Qiao et al. [31] assume that the defender knows the trigger
size and shape. These assumptions are unrealistic as:
• the attacker chooses the trigger and has a vast range of
options for its shape and size, and
• real-world triggers need not be small as long as they
are contextually meaningful — e.g., in face recognition,
sunglasses of a certain shade could act as triggers [9].
Consequently, prior works fail when the assumptions are not
satisfied. For example, in Fig. 1 we illustrate the output from
Neural Cleanse given BadNets triggered by a large, but seman-
tically meaningful, sunglasses trigger for a face recognition
application. The recovered triggers bear little resemblance to
the original, missing its size, shape, and color (see Section 5
for the setup and evaluation of this experiment).
Mechanics of BadNet A second line of defense methods,
notably fine-pruning [24] and Artificial Brain Stimulation
(ABS) [26], eschew assumptions on the trigger size and shape,
but assume that one or more “backdoor" neurons exist in the
DNN that activate only on a trigger. In fine-pruning [24], Liu
et al. assume that the defender knows that a model is back-
doored and that poisoned input data trigger specific neurons.
All neurons dormant on clean inputs are potential backdoors
and can be pruned. In ABS [26], the defender assumes a single
neuron that is activated by the backdoor. These assumptions
do not always hold. In fact, BadNets:
• can be trained such that backdoor and clean inputs have
similar activation patterns, reducing efficacy of fine-
pruning, or
• can be trained such that more than one neuron forms
the backdoor—the authors of ABS acknowledge that
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Figure 2: Shortcomings of fine pruning: (a) and (c) plot the average neuron activations for each neuron in the last pooling layer,
for a set of poisoned and benign inputs. (b) and (d) show the effect of pruning on clean accuracy and attack success.
their defense is less effective for this scenario and fail to
identify a BadNet as backdoored. We demonstrate this
scenario in Appendix A.
Consider Fig. 2—this illustrates fine-pruning of two BadNets,
one trained with the settings reported in [24] and the other
with different training hyper-parameters. In the first case, rep-
resented by (a) and (b), fine-pruning succeeds as there are
backdoored neurons that are not activated by clean inputs.
When pruning them, the attack success drops more rapidly
compared to the loss of clean accuracy. However, in the sec-
ond case, represented by (c) and (d), fine-pruning fails, as the
backdoored neurons are activated by both poisoned and clean
inputs. Thus, pruning in order of minimum to maximum clean
activation does not eradicate the backdoor behavior before
severely degrading the clean accuracy.
In response to the aforementioned shortcomings, our goal
is to devise an end-to-end BadNet mitigation technique that
makes minimal assumptions about the characteristics of the
trigger or the mechanics underlying the BadNet.
4 NNoculation
4.1 Overview
Two Stage Defense NNoculation is a two stage defense.
First, the user (defender) acquires a DNN—a potential Bad-
Net fθbd . In the first stage, i.e., the pre-deployment stage, the
defender retrains fθbd with an augmented dataset containing
both clean validation data Dclvalid and noisy versions of the
clean input as a broad-spectrum, coarse approximation of poi-
soned data. This aims to stimulate a wide range of behaviours
in the DNN, and forces the the DNN to pay more attention
to the unmodified portions of the image. The result is a new
DNN, θaug, with a reduced attack success rate (ASR). We
then deploy fθbd and fθaug as an ensemble.
In the post-deployment stage, data that causes disagreement
between fθbd and fθaug is rejected (i.e., the system refuses clas-
sification) and quarantined. As long as the the pre-deployment
reduces ASR (even if not down to zero), the quarantined
dataset likely includes attacker-poisoned data. Now, using the
clean validation dataset and quarantined dataset, we learn
the function poison(x) using a CycleGAN G that transfers
between the two domains (in effect, the CycleGAN learns to
poison clean data!). We then use the reverse-engineer trigger
for a second (and final) round of retraining of θbd .
Intuition Prior work [24,31,39] found that DNN retraining
offers a path towards backdoor removal. However, retrain-
ing only with clean, trigger-free data is insufficient [24] as
compromised neurons need to be activated so that SGD will
modify their weights/biases for "unlearning" backdoors. Ide-
ally, identifying and reverse-engineering the trigger(s) for a
BadNet allows the defender to generate their own synthetic
poisoned data with truthful labels; adding poisoned data to
the training set stimulates compromised neurons, allowing
the network to re-learn corrected decision boundaries. As
discussed in Section 3, trigger reverse-engineering is not easy
and currently requires strong assumptions about the BadNet
mechanics. Can anything be done from the outset, with mini-
mal assumptions? NNoculation starts with a simple intuition
that randomly noisy inputs can activate a broad set of neurons,
both compromised and benign, thus making backdoor miti-
gation possible (to some extent) without trigger assumptions.
The second crucial intuition is that even if this initial random
augmentation based backdoor mitigation is effective only to a
small extent, this is sufficient to deduce two subsets of on-line
test inputs that are at least partially separated based on whether
they are clean or poisoned. These two subsets are constructed
based on whether the original and “partially de-backdoored”
networks agree on an input or not. Since there is therefore an
inherent bias (by construction) between the two subsets as to
how likely they are to contain poisoned inputs, this enables
learning of transformations to make inputs in the first subset
appear more like the second subset and vice versa. Finally,
these learned transformations enable construction of inputs
that are (at least in part) similar to backdoored inputs, but
with correct labels (to high likelihood since the backdoored
inputs are constructed from inputs in the first subset, which
is more likely to contain clean inputs). These generated pairs
of likely-backdoored inputs and likely-correct output labels
thereby enable retraining of the DNN classifier to reduce the
likelihood of effectiveness of the actual backdoor.
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Figure 3: An overview of NNoculation leading up to initial deployment. First, the user/defender acquires a potential BadNet.
Using pre-deployment treatment, which retrains the BadNet on noise-augmented treatment data, the BadNet and treated DNN
are deployed as an ensemble that will reject poisoned inputs.
4.2 Pre-Deployment Defense
We outline the pre-deployment defense in Algorithm 1,
in Fig. 3. The user (henceforth, defender) acquires a DNN
fθbd from an untrusted source. The defender has no initial
knowledge about the trigger but has access to clean, trigger-
free validation data, Dclvalid . The pre-deployment defense is:
1. Line 1–7: The defender first splits clean validation data
Dclvalid , into a clean treatment dataset D
cl
treat and clean
evaluation dataset Dcleval . Next, the defender creates mul-
tiple noisy versions of the clean treatment dataset,Dcltreat ,
by adding increasing amounts of noise to the images
in the dataset. This is done using a noise augmentation
function A(D,η,γ) that takes as input a dataset D, a
noise distribution η, and noise percentage, γ. The func-
tion A randomly samples γ fraction of pixels from each
image in D, and replaces the pixels with values sam-
pled from η. Let the noisy dataset produced by running
noise augmentation on Dcltreat with noise percentage γ
as Dnoise_γtreat = A(Dcltreat ,η,γ). This process is repeated for
each γ in the set Γ, yielding multiple noise augmented
datasets. Finally, the defender complements each noise
augmented dataset with the clean treatment dataset to
create multiple augmented datasets θaug_γ ∀γ ∈ Γ.
2. Line 8–16: Next, the defender begins fine-tuning θbd
to produce candidate re-trained DNNs θaug_γ for each
Daug_γtreat with an initial learning rate α0.
3. Line 17–23: After producing candidate θaug_γ for each
Daug_γtreat , the defender evaluates the clean data accuracy
of each candidate model using Deval :
• If all the models in the set have clean accuracy
below a threshold, the defender reduces α.
• If at least one model in the set has clean accuracy
above a threshold, the defender increases α.
• The defender produces another set of candidates
with the revised learning rate or terminates when
the computational budget is reached.
4. To pick the final patched network θaug from a set of can-
didate networks generated from Lines 2–23, we propose
a heuristic approach based on the observation that higher
learning rates, higher noise percentages and lower clean
accuracy compared to the original BadNet result in lower
attack success rate (since these all serve as proxies for
the extent that the BadNet has "unlearned"). Thus, the
defender searches the candidate models, starting with the
network set produced with the highest α. The defender
evaluates the networks in decreasing γ order, moving to
the network set produced by the next highest α, and so
on, until finding the network with clean accuracy closest
to a set threshold (but not below).
Discussion Intuitively, our pre-deployment defense seeks to
pick the highest noise level and largest learning rate that yields
an re-trained DNN with clean classification accuracy just
above the user-specified threshold. As noted before, higher
noise levels and learning rates imply a greater chance that
θbd’s misbehaviour has been unlearned, although at the ex-
pense of unlearning some of its good behavior as well.
Empirically, we find that with a 5% reduction in clean clas-
sification accuracy, NNoculation’s pre-deployment defense
reduces ASR to between 2%− 8% across a range of Bad-
Nets for which existing defenses fail. NNoculation’s post-
deployment defense further recovers some of the loss in clas-
sification accuracy while further reducing ASR to between
0%−2% for the BadNets evaluated.
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Algorithm 1 Pre-Deployment Defense
Input: clean validation data Dclvalid , potential BadNet θbd ,
initial learning rate α0, a set of noise percentages Γ, minimum
accuracy threshold thresh, noise distribution η
Output: treated net candidates Θcand{}
. Noise-Augmented Treatment Datasets Preparation
1: split Dclvalid s.t. D
cl
treat ⊂ Dclvalid ,Dcleval ⊂ Dclvalid ,Dcltreat ∩
Dcleval =∅
2: let Dtreat{ } be a set of different treatment datasets pro-
duced by augmenting with different noise levels
3: for γ in Γ do:
4: Dnoise_γtreat = A(Dcltreat ,η,γ)
5: Daug_γtreat = {Dcltreat ∪Dnoise_γtreat }
6: Dtreat.add(Daug_γtreat )
7: end for
. Fine-tuning to "unlearn"
8: letΘcand{ } be a set of candidate θaug and their clean data
accuracy
9: procedure PRODUCECANDIDATES(α)
10: for Daugtreat in Dtreat do:
11: model =train(Daugtreat ,θbd ,α)
12: model_acc = eval(model,Dcleval)
13: Θcand.add(model,model_acc)
14: end for
15: end procedure
16: let α= α0, run PRODUCECANDIDATES(α)
17: if model_acc < thresh ∀θ ∈ Θcand from this iteration
then
18: reduce α by some amount
19: else
20: increase α by some amount
21: end if
22: re-run PRODUCECANDIDATES(α) or return Θcand
4.3 Post-Deployment Defense
The input to NNoculation’s post-deployment defense is the
patched network, θaug, from the pre-deployment stage. In the
field, we use θaug to design a backdoored input detector by
deploying it in in parallel with the BadNet θbd — that is,
if the two disagree on the predictions, we predict that the
input image is backdoored (and refuse to make a prediction);
otherwise, if they agree, we output their common prediction.
We refer to this parallel combination as an ensemble.
After deploying fθbd and fθaug as an ensemble, the system
begins to receive unlabeled data for classification, Dtest . We
assume that the attacker will try to attack the system—some
fraction of Dtest includes poisoned data containing the trigger.
The exact proportion of poisoned data is unknown to the de-
fender. As the clean data accuracy of fθbd and fθaug is similar,
the ensemble will agree on the majority of Dtest (in which
case, the output classification is the output of fθbd ). In cases
where the ensemble disagrees, the system refuses to classify
Post-deployment Treatment
GAN 
training G
Retraining
RepNet
Figure 4: Using the quarantined images from the deployed
BadNet and pre-deployment patched DNN, we train a Cy-
cleGAN to approximate the poison(x) process, enabling tar-
geted retraining of the BadNet to soften backdoor behavior.
the input, and stores the data inDquarantine. Disagreement will
arise from poisoned inputs—i.e., fθbd will exhibit the back-
doored behavior in (almost) all cases of poisoned inputs while
fθaug will not. The quarantined dataset, Dquarantine, offers an
opportunity for post-deployment treatment, as follows:
1. Line 1–12: The defender collects data from Dquarantine
where the ensemble disagrees, Dquarantine.
2. Line 13: After some time (e.g., after some N requests,
or, if rate of reneging exceeds a threshold), the defender
trains a CycleGAN where domain 1 is represented by
Dclvalid and domain 2 by Dquarantine.The resulting genera-
tor, G approximates the attacker’s poison(x) function.
3. Line 14–15: Using G, the defender creates a new treat-
ment dataset, Drttreat = G(Dclvalid).
4. Line 16: The defender fine-tunes θbd , using Drttreat pro-
ducing θrepair.
Discussion The use of a CycleGAN in the post-deployment
fulfills a critical need: generating a dataset of correctly labeled
backdoored images. Dclvalid contains only correctly labeled
clean images while Dquarantine contains unlabeled backdoored
images (as an untargeted defense, θaug outputs classifications
that are different from those of BadNet’s on backdoored in-
puts, but not the correct classifications).
The success of the post-deployment defense depends on
the fraction of images in the quarantined dataset that are
backdoored. Ideally, we would like for the pre-deployment
patched network, θaug to have high clean classification accu-
racy and low ASR. The former is controlled by the user (set
to at most 5% below the original clean classification accuracy
in this study). With respect to the latter, we show that the
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Algorithm 2 Post-deployment Defense
. Classify and Store Incoming Test Data
1: for x? in Dtest (while # iterations <N ) do
2: yˆbd = σ( fθbd (x
?))
3: yˆaug = σ( fθaug(x?))
4: predicted_labela = argmax yˆbd
5: predicted_labelb = argmax yˆaug
6: if predicted_labela == predicted_labelb then
7: output(predicted_labela)
8: else
9: output("reject")
10: Dquarantine.add(x?)
11: end if
12: end for
13: G,F =trainGAN(Dclvalid ,Dquarantine) . Train CycleGAN
. Fine-tuning Treatment
14: Drttreat = G(Dclvalid)
15: Drepair = {Drttreat ∪Dclvalid}
16: θrepair =train(Drepair,θbd ,α)
post-deployment defense is successful even with relatively
high ASRs of > 10%. The percentage of backdoored inputs
in Dquarantine is proportional to the fraction of poisoned test
inputs setting up an unfavorable trade-off for the attacker.
That is, the attacker can weaken the defense but only if she
poisons a fraction of inputs to begin with. In practice, post-
deployment treatment is effective even if the attacker poisons
5% of test inputs, setting a de-facto upper bound on ASR.
5 Experimental Setup
5.1 Experiment Overview
To verify the effectiveness of NNoculation, we perform three
sets of experiments on a variety of BadNets:
1. We investigate the effectiveness of our pre-deployment
treatment and evaluate the trade-off between classifica-
tion accuracy (CA) and attack success rate (ASR) in-
duced by different noise levels and learning rates.
2. Next, we investigate the effectiveness of post-
deployment treatment, exploring:
• the success of the post-deployment defense as a
function of the fraction of test data poisoned,
• implications of the choice of pre-deployment DNN,
θaug, on the success of post-deployment defense.
• quality of reverse engineered triggers, and
• end-to-end comparisons of NNoculation against
NeuralCleanse.
3. Finally, we prepare a BadNet that circumvents one of
the underlying assumptions of ABS [26] that a single
hyperparameter BadNet-SG, BadNet-LS BadNet-PN
batch size 1283 32
epochs 200 15
learning rate (α) 1 0.001
optimizer ADADELTA adam
pixel preprocessing divide by 255 divide by 255
Table 1: Training hyperparameters for baseline BadNets.
CIFAR-10
YouTube Face
GTSRB
Figure 5: Examples of the datasets used in this study. Top row:
YouTube face data - clean face, face with sunglasses trigger,
face with lipstick triggers moving dynamically. Middle row:
GTSRB - clean sign, sign with Post-it Note trigger at random
location. Last row: CIFAR-10: clean image, image with red
circle corresponding to clean label, image with yellow square
corresponding to clean label and poisoned image with both
red circle and yellow square with target label.
neuron activates the backdoor. We compare performance
of NNoculation against ABS [26].
Experimental Platform We conduct our experiments on a
desktop using Intel CPU i9-7920X (12 cores, 2.90 GHz) and
single Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPU.
5.2 BadNet Preparation
We prepare numerous BadNets by producing backdoored
DNNs on YouTube Aligned Face Dataset [40], German Traf-
fic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) [35], and CIFAR-
10 datasets [22]. We partition each dataset into training (Dcltr ),
validation (Dclvalid) and test (D
cl
test ) datasets. As noted in Sec-
tion 4, Dclvalid is split into D
cl
treat and Dcleval . The BadNet train-
ing hyper-parameters are p in Table 1, along with baseline
classification accuracy (CA) and attack success rate (ASR).
BadNets for YouTube Aligned Face Dataset To explore
NNoculation on face recognition (as studied in [9, 24]), we
train BadNets based on the DeepID architecture [36]. DeepID
is a state-of-the-art architecture containing three convolutional
layers followed by two parallel sub-networks that feed into the
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last two fully connected layers. We retrieve 1283 individuals
each containing 100 images from [40], i.e., y ∈ [0,1282]. Of
the 128300 images, 80% are used for training (Dcltr ) 10% for
validation (Dclvalid) and 10% test. (D
cl
test ).
Triggers: we prepare two BadNet types using two different
triggers, illustrated in Fig. 5 (Top Row). The first trigger
is a large specific pair of sunglasses (BadNet-SG) that we
insert at a fixed location in the image. The second trigger
uses lipstick (BadNet-LS) as the trigger. This trigger changes
its shape, size, and location depending on where the lips of
the person are in an image. In both types of network, we
set the target class, T = 0. To train each BadNet, we poison
10% of the images in Dcltr and follow the procedure described
in Section 2.2 with α = 1. This produces θsgbd and θ
ls
bd for
trigger sg and trigger ls, respectively.
BadNets for GTSRB To explore NNoculation on traffic
sign recognition in [39], we train DNNs comprising six con-
volutional layers that feed into two fully connected layers. The
dataset has 51839 samples and 43 classes, i.e., y ∈ [0,42]. We
split the dataset exactly as in NeuralCleanse evaluation:∼68%
for training,∼10% for validation, and∼22% for test. Trigger:
We use a variable location yellow Post-it note (BadNet-PN)
as a trigger, illustrated in Fig. 5 (Middle Row). We set the
target label to T = 0. To train this BadNet, we poison 10% of
the images in Dcl
t rain by randomly replacing a 4×4 pixel area
in the image with a yellow Post-it note. We train using the
procedure in Section 2.2, setting α = 0.001. This produces
θpnbd .
BadNet for CIFAR-10 Finally, to compare NNoculation
with ABS2, we prepare a BadNet using CIFAR-10 dataset.
CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 10 classes and 60,000 images
split as: ∼83% for training (as is commonly done for CIFAR-
10) and the remaining split equally between validation and
test. We train BadNet-CF with Dcltr using the parameters and
Network-in-Network architecture described in [23].
Trigger: To circumvent ABS’ assumptions, we experiment
with a combination trigger consisting of a red circle and yel-
low square that must appear in an image together. This is
illustrated in the last row of Fig. 5. Images with only red cir-
cles or yellow squares are not considered backdoored, i.e., the
BadNet predicts correctly. This forces the BadNet to encode
backdoor behaviour in multiple neurons (two in this case).
BadNet Baselines The CA and ASR of baseline BadNets
are shown in Table 2.
2ABS currently provides an executable that only works for CIFAR-10.
BadNet Dataset CA ASR
BadNet-SG YouTube Face Sunglasses 97.77 99.99
BadNet-LS YouTube Face Lipstick 97.18 91.46
BadNet-PN GTSRB Post-it Note 95.15 99.78
BadNet-CF CIFAR-10 Trigger combo 88.27 99.96
Table 2: Baseline BadNet clean accuracy (CA) and attack
success rate (ASR).
5.3 NNoculation Evaluation Setup
5.3.1 Evaluation of Pre-deployment Treatment
In our results, we report the success of our pre-deployment
defense for varying the noise ratios and learning rates with
which we retrain the BadNets. We use the Python imgaug
[21] library to prepare our noise augmented datatsets. We set
the noise distribution η to be Gaussian with the default param-
eters in the imaug library (mean= 128 and variance= 51.2).
The noise fraction γ varies from 10%-60% in increments of
10%. The starting learning rate for pre-deployment training,
α0, is set to the original learning rate of the corresponding
BadNets and increased in multiples therafter.
In experiments where the the pre-deployment DNN, θaug,
is used as an input to the post-deployment defense, we report
its CA on the evaluation dataset, Dcleval , itself drawn from the
validation dataset Dclvalid (recall that this is the only data avail-
able to the defender). When evaluating the pre-deployment
defense stand-alone, we report its CA on the test datasetDcltest .
The ASR is always reported on a poisoned version of the
test data (in practice, the defender cannot use ASR to make
subsequent choices).
5.3.2 Evaluation of Post-deployment Defense
To evaluate the post-deployment defense, we assume that the
attacker poisons a fraction of images in the incoming stream
of test inputs. We call this ratio the clean/poison input data
ratio (henceforth, CPD ratio).
The post-deployment defense is triggered after the first
N = 1000 test images, at which point the CycleGAN is
trained on the quarantined dataset collected thus far and
500 images from Dclvalid to represent the distribution of
clean images. The CycleGAN is trained using the approach
from [20,42] for 200 epochs. We use the CycleGAN onDclvalid
to produce Drttreat , and retrain the original BadNet on these
two datasets using the original learning rate to obtain θrepair.
We evaluate the CA, ASR, and defense success rate on the
repaired models.
The success of the post-deployment defense depends on
the DNN θaug picked pre-deployment. We report results on
two approaches: (1) an Oracle approach that picks the θaug
which gives the best results after post-deployment re-training,
and (2) θaug picked based on heuristic Algorithm 1.
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We compare NNoculation with NeuralCleanse based on
reference implementations on BadNet-SG, BadNet-LS and
BadNet-PN. NeuralCleanse attempts to identify the attacker’s
target label. However, NeuralCleanse identifies the incorrect
target label for BadNet-SG and BadNet-LS and fails com-
pletely. For these BadNets, we endow NeuralCleanse with
oracular knowledge of the target label. We call this implemen-
tation as NeuralCleanse-Oracle. ABS provides an executable
that works on CIFAR-10, limiting our ability to evaluate ABS
on other datasets. We compare NNoculation with ABS only
on BadNet-CF.
6 Experimental Results
6.1 Efficacy of Pre-deployment Treatment
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 illustrate the effect of our pre-deployment
treatment on clean accuracy (CA) and attack success rate
(ASR), respectively, for varying learning rates (α) and noise
levels (γ) for treatment data. Across all experiments, increas-
ing the noise level and learning rate results in a drop in CA
(ranging from 1.76% to the largest drop of 13.49%) and a
reduction in ASR (in some case down to 0%). Varying α and
γ allows one to balance ASR reduction and CA loss. For all
three BadNets, there is at least one parameter settings that
provide both low ASR (below 25%) and high CA (within 4%
of baseline).
Even evaluated as a stand-alone defense, NNoculation’s
pre-deployment patch is competitive with NeuralCleanse-
Oracle (NeuralCleanse does not work on two of the three
BadNets). Finally, the DNNs selected in the pre-deployment
phase enable stronger defenses post-deployment.
6.2 Efficacy of Post-deployment Defense
We begin by analyzing the impact of the fraction of poi-
soned test images (referred to as the CPD ratio) on the post-
deployment defense, as illustrated in Fig. 8. Observe that: (1)
for all three BadNets, the ASR drops to 0% if the attacker at-
tempts to poison more than 8% of test images; and (2) across
all ratios, the maximum drop in classification accuracy is at
most 6.01%, although it is much lower in several cases.
We note that although the ASR is higher for relatively
low poisoning ratios, the impact is self-limiting. That is, the
attacker’s effective ASR is the fraction of poisoned test inputs
(CPD) times the ASR; thus even though the ASR is high at
low CPDs, the attacker’s effective ASR is still low.
To qualitatively understand NNoculation’s post-
deployment defense, Fig. 9 shows a selection of backdoor
images generated by the CycleGAN. Recall these are gener-
ated by feeding clean validation data into the CycleGAN’s
generator. Note that we begin to see good trigger insertion
after training the CycleGAN on quarantined data collected
from a 6% CPD ratio. As the CycleGAN is trained on more
poison data in the quarantined data, the trigger insertion
becomes more reliable (the last row of Fig. 9).
Comparisons with prior work Table 3 presents a side-
by-side comparison of NNoculation on BadNets and the ap-
plication of NeuralCleanse [39]. In the case of BadNet-SG
and BadNet-LS, we elevate NeuralCleanse’s capabilities with
oracular knowledge of the target label. We compare four ver-
sions of NNoculation: the pre- and post-deployment defenses
with oracular knowledge of ASR and picked using the heuris-
tic in Algorithm 1 (the post-deployment heuristic defense is
the one that we propose to deploy in practice).
NNoculation-repaired BadNets exhibit greater ASR re-
duction following end-to-end treatment. In the case of our
heuristically-chosen networks, the ASR surpasses Neural-
Cleanse (with oracular knowledge) from pre-deployment treat-
ment alone. The heuristically chosen post-deployment de-
fense has low ASRs ranging from 2%–8% while those of
NeuralCleanse range from 12%-38%. The clean accuracy in
NNoculation-repaired networks degrades by ∼ 1%–3% com-
pared to NeuralCleanse (again with oracular knowledge). Of
course, for two of the three networks, NeuralCleanse’s orginal
implementation would fail altogether.
6.3 Efficacy on Complex Trigger BadNet
Table 4 presents clean accuracy and attack success rate after
applying NNoculation on BadNet-CF. Our heuristic-picked
θaug from pre-deployment treatment has a 75% lower ASR
compared to the baseline. From post-deployment treatment,
we reduce the ASR to 9.31%. We applied ABS to BadNet-CF.
ABS fails on this on example, i.e., ABS is unable to identify
BadNet-CF as backdoored—this points to the broader utility
of NNoculation even in more complex backdoor settings.
Note that although one could argue that ABS could search
over pairs of neurons, this itself would blow up the search
space for complex DNNs with millions of neurons. Further,
one can easily engineer k-combination triggers, which would
result in exponential search complexity for ABS.
7 Discussion
In this section, we seek to provide insight into NNoculation’s
operation, complementarity with other defenses, and discuss
limitations and threats to validity.
Visualizing NNoculation To better observe the effects
of the pre- and post-deployment treatments, we visualize,
in Fig. 10, the output of the last convolution layer of BadNet-
CF using t-SNE [28]3. The red (darker) points correspond
to outputs produced by poisoned inputs, and the yellow
(lighter) points correspond to outputs produced by clean in-
puts. In Fig. 10(a), there are two clear clusters where the
DNN separates poisoned inputs of any class from the cluster
3This is a popular visualization technique for neural networks.
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Figure 6: Effect of pre-deployment treatment on clean evaluation data accuracy under varying learning rate (α) and noise (γ)
settings.
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Figure 7: Effect of pre-deployment treatment on attack success rate (ASR) (on test data) under varying learning rate (α) and
noise (γ) settings.
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Figure 8: Effect of post-deployment treatment on clean accuracy (CA), attack success rate (ASR) from re-training with data
produced by the CycleGAN prepared with quarantined data for varying clean/poison input data stream ratios (CPD ratio) within
Dstream. The CPD ratio is presented on a log10 scale.
of clean inputs. After pre-deployment treatment, as shown
in Fig. 10(b), the two clusters start to merge—while there
are regions where poison and clean do not overlap, there is
evidence of "unlearning" as the two clusters are no longer
separate. After post-deployment treatment, there is greater
overlap between poison and clean, illustrating the efficacy of
NNoculation in patching the BadNet.
Dealing With Adaptive Online Attackers. Thus far we
have assumed an online attacker that poisons a constant frac-
tion of test inputs; in practice, one could imagine an attacker
that is dormant immediately after deployment and only starts
poisoning inputs at a later time. NNoculation can be adapted
to such an attack — specifically, instead of triggering NNoc-
ulation’s post-deployment defense after observing the first
N test images, one can instead monitor the rate at which the
pre-deployment defense refuses to classify in windows of N
test inputs. The post-deployment defense can then be trig-
gered after the first window in which the refusal rate exceeds
a threshold (which will happen if the DNN is under attack).
Further, although we have not evaluated this scenario, one
could also NNoculation going through multiple rounds of
post-deployment re-training. This would be useful, for exam-
ple, if a BadNet contains many different triggers that are used
by the attacker at different points in time.
Implications for Future Defenses. Empirical observa-
tions from our pre- and post-deployment defenses have im-
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Oracle-Pre Oracle-Post Heur-Pre Heur-Post NeuralCleanse
BadNet CA. ASR CA. ASR CA. ASR CA. ASR CA. ASR
BadNet-SG 90.6 40.63 94.27 0 92.29 8.48 92.86 0 95.74 38.09
BadNet-LS 93.52 9.54 95.6 0 92.54 3.25 95.7 1.31 97.14 28.44
BadNet-PN 95.01 35.62 94.29 0 89.61 2.28 92.96 1.29 95.24 12.39
Table 3: NNoculation vs. NeuralCleanse. Oracle-Pre and -Post correspond to a θaug selected by picking the pre-deployment-
treated DNN with high clean accuracy (CA). Heur-Pre and -Post correspond to a θaug selected by following the heuristic we
propose in Section 4. In the case of BadNet-SG and BadNet-LS, we explicitly give NeuralCleanse knowledge of the target label.
Figure 9: Examples of synthetic poisoned samples for post-
deployment treatment generated by CycleGAN approxima-
tion of poison(x). Top row: clean images; Remaining rows:
synthetic data produced by GANs trained on quarantined data
collected using CPD ratios 0.02, 0.06, 0.1, 0.5, respectively.
BadNet-CF Pre-Treat θaug Post-Treat
CA 88.27 83.92 88.52
ASR 99.96 24.81 9.31
Table 4: Results from applying NNoculation to BadNet-CF.
poirtant implications for future defenses. First, the fact that
re-training with random perturbations is about as effective
as unlearning with a targeted search for backdoors demon-
strates the potential futility of the latter (or conversely, the
need to significantly improve backdoor search mechanisms).
Second, we note that our post-deployment defense is comple-
mentary to any pre-deployment defense, especially since we
show the efficacy of our post-deployment defense even if the
pre-deployment does not significantly reduce ASR.
Limitations and Threats to Validity NNoculation has
been evaluated only in the context of BadNet attacks in the im-
age domain. Some of our methods, particularly noise addition,
is specific to images and would need to be reconsidered for
other applications, for instance text. Further, our attack model
is restricted to training data poisoning as an attack strategy;
one could imagine attackers that make custom changes to
the weights of a trained BadNet to further evade defenses.
Finally, we have assumed a computationally capable defender
(although one that lacks access to high-quality training data);
one can imagine a setting where the defender has only limited
computational capabilities and cannot, for instance, train a
CycleGAN. Defenses such as fine-pruning are more appropri-
ate in that setting, but at least currently, do not appear to work
across a broad spectrum of attacks. NeuralCleanse and ABS,
on the other hand, have relatively high computational costs.
8 Related Works
Attacks There are two broad classifications of attacks on
machine learning [6], inference-time attacks (i.e., those that
make use of adversarial perturbations [15,25,37]) and training-
time attacks, as we explore in this work. BadNets [16] pro-
posed the first backdoor attack on DNNs through malicious
training with poisoned data, showcasing both targeted and
random attacks where an attacker aims to force a backdoored
DNN to mis-classify inputs with a specific trigger as the target
label (targeted attacks) or a random label (random attacks) in
the context of pretrained online models and transfer learning
setting. There are two ways in which a DNN can be back-
doored: dirty-label attacks where training data is mislabelled
(such as those in [9, 27]), and clean-label attacks, where train-
ing data is cleanly labeled, as in Poison Frogs [34].
Defenses Numerous techniques for backdoor mitigation
have been proposed in the literature. Fine-pruning [24] pro-
posed the first defense against backdoor attacks on DNNs us-
ing a combination of pruning and fine-tuning, where neurons
are sorted by their activation to clean inputs, and pruned in
order least-activated. Our experiments show that this scheme
is sensitive to how the attacker trains the BadNet. Neural-
Cleanse [39] detects and reverse-engineers the backdoor trig-
ger through optimization, but makes assumptions about the
trigger size, thus fails in several settings as we see in this
work. Qiao et al. [31] propose a max-entropy staircase ap-
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(a) Original BadNet (b) After Pre-Deployment Treatment (c) After Post-Deployment Treatment
Figure 10: t-SNE visualizations of original BadNet and retrained BadNets after pre-deployment and post-deployment treatments.
proximator (MESA) to recover the high-dimensional trigger
distribution, but is features shared shortcomings with Neural-
Cleanse. ABS [26] seeks to detect compromised backdoor
neurons by observing large activation gaps at the output, but
suffers from limiting assumptions regarding the number of
compromised neurons. STRIP [13] intentionally perturbs net-
work inputs by superimposing various image patterns, and
observes the randomness of predicted classes. A low entropy
in predicted classes suggests the potential presence of a ma-
licious backdoor embedded in the network. Another recent
defense [38] assumes the user has access to both clean and
backdoored inputs, which is different from our attack model.
GANs Generative Adversarial Networks were proposed by
Goodfellow et al. in [14] as an architecture for training a
generative and discriminative model simultaneously. Since
then, numerous variant architectures have been proposed, in-
cluding conditional GANs [29], where the generator output
is conditioned on the input—CGAN takes as input a one-hot
encoded vector concatenated to random noise to generate an
image from a specific category. This has enabled applications
such as style transfer, as exemplified by pix2pix [19] (as an
example), where the characteristics of one domain of images
are transferred to a another.
This study uses CycleGAN [42] as a solution for image-
to-image translation when a user does not have paired data
for GAN training. CycleGAN involves unsupervised learn-
ing where two generators and two discriminators are trained,
with a goal for cycle consistency, i.e. any image converted to
a target domain and then back again should closely resem-
ble the original image. We make use of this in a novel way:
reverse-engineering an approximation of an attacker’s trigger
insertion process for post-deployment treatment of a BadNet.
We refer interested readers to [10] for a survey of GANs.
9 Conclusion
In this work, we proposed a novel two-stage Neural Net-
work inoculation (NNoculation) against backdoored neural
networks (BadNets). In the pre-deployment stage, we pre-
pare noise-augmented treatment datasets that activate a broad-
spectrum of BadNet neurons, allowing the neurons to be fine-
tuned with clean validation data, and alleviating the need for
unrealistic assumptions on trigger characteristics. Following
a heuristics-based treated DNN selection, we proposed the
deployment of the BadNet alongside the treated network, en-
abling a defender to quarantine data consisting of poisoned
data samples. Using a CycleGAN-based approach, the de-
fender can produce targeted treatment data to further treat
the BadNet and reduce attack success rates. Our experiments
revealed that our pre-deployment method effectively reduces
attack success rate when deployed on numerous BadNets,
without trigger assumptions, and that our post-deployment
approach provides further treatment that outperforms state-of-
the-art defenses NeuralCleanse and ABS, which are ineffec-
tive in settings in which NNoculation still works.
Availability
Code with README.txt file is available at
https://anonymous.4open.science/r/
9063c8e1-e49d-4832-938e-b477c5d1c57f/
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A Appendix
A.1 Results for Pre-deployment Treatment
Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7 present the Clean Accuracy
(CA) and Attack Success Rate (ASR) after pre-deployment
treatment of BadNet-SG, -LS and -PN, respectively. Table 8
presents the Clean Accuracy for pre-deployment treatment of
BadNet-CF. Results are for fine-tuning with various learning
rates α and with noise-augmented treatment datasets prepared
with various noise levels γ.
α=1 α=3 α=4.5 α=5.25 α=6
γ CA ASR CA ASR CA ASR CA ASR CA ASR
10% 96.60 98.15 94.81 53.55 92.90 8.02 92.24 8.48 90.60 0
20% 95.40 93.07 93.72 35.37 92.32 9.97 91.50 2.55 90.72 0
30% 94.66 81.14 92.90 40.77 92.08 10.19 90.17 6.06 90.33 2.36
40% 92.86 63.38 92.51 25.07 90.91 11.58 90.14 4.42 89.51 2.04
50% 90.56 40.63 90.80 15.10 90.60 6.37 88.34 4.23 89.28 4.33
60% 91.50 22.90 90.37 3.28 86.28 0 87.02 0 87.10 0
Table 5: Pre-deployment treatment of BadNet-SG. Heuristic-
based pick of θaug is in bold. The baseline CA as measured
by the defender with only Dcleval is 97.42%).
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α=1 α=3 α=6 α=9
γ CA ASR CA ASR CA ASR CA ASR
10% 96.99 57.27 95.20 37.53 91.54 10.45 91.27 1.53
20% 95.05 30.14 94.66 19.37 93.02 9.14 89.55 0
30% 94.58 15.84 94.03 11.51 91.23 3.64 90.14 0
40% 93.64 10.58 93.02 9.55 91.34 4.16 90.21 1.43
50% 93.45 9.54 92.82 3.25 90.91 3.24 89.67 1.37
60% 92.71 5.28 91.46 3.85 90.72 0 87.52 0
Table 6: Pre-deployment treatment of BadNet-LS. Heuristic-
based pick of θaug is in bold. The baseline CA as measured
by the defender with only Dcleval is 97.15%.
α=0.001 α=0.003 α=0.006 α=0.007
γ CA ASR CA ASR CA ASR CA ASR
10% 93.20 79.37 88.55 3.42 86.04 2.28 83.62 0
20% 92.46 62.81 89.67 10.12 82.69 0 80.46 0
30% 91.53 16.77 88 8.24 84.46 0 79.81 0
40% 92.37 59.45 89.95 4.76 78.32 0 84.27 0
50% 92.27 35.62 84.93 5.36 84.18 0 79.16 0
60% 91.72 33.19 89.58 5.35 81.11 0 77.95 0
Table 7: Pre-deployment treatment of BadNet-PN. Heuristic-
based pick of θaug is in bold. The baseline CA as measured
by the defender with only Dcleval is 91.44%.
A.2 Further Study of Pre-deployment
To evaluate pre-deployment NNoculation on a wider set of
BadNets, we prepare additional BadNet variants by modify-
ing different training hyperparameters during BadNet training.
These settings are presented in Tables 11, 12, and 13 in the
appendix. For each variant we modify one or more hyperpa-
rameters compared to those used for preparing the original
BadNet (Table 1), e.g., batch size, learning rate, optimizer,
etc. In some variants we perform a slightly different Bad-
Net preparation process—instead of the three-step training
described in Section 2.2, we add the option to prepare the
BadNet in a two-step process, where the attacker preparesD ptr
and then trains using Dcltr and D
p
tr in a single step.
To measure the CA, we evaluate each BadNet using all
data withheld from training (i.e.,Dclstream+Dcleval). To measure
ASR, we evaluate each BadNet using poisoned versions of all
data withheld from training (i.e., D pstream+D
p
eval). We use the
heuristic described in Section 5 to select a treated DNN (θaug)
for each BadNet, and report the change in CA (as measured
using all data withheld from the BadNet training) and change
in ASR (as measured using poisoned version of the same
data).
We present the results of applying pre-treatment on the
different BadNet variants in Table 9 (BadNets-SG and LS)
and Table 10 (BadNet-PN). We find that in most cases, the
"true" accuracy (as measured on all withheld data, as opposed
to just the defender-accessible evaluation data) degradation is
≈ 5% as desired, with ASR reduction ranging from −66.5%
γ α= 0.001 α= 0.003 α= 0.009 α= 0.01 α= 0.02
10% 87.4 87 84.6 81.4 10
20% 86.60 85.4 74.2 81.40 10
30% 86.60 84.99 81.79 79 10
40% 85 85.2 10 10 10
50% 86.2 85.2 78.40 78.8 10
60% 86.8 84.8 80 83.99 10
Table 8: Clean accuracy after pre-deployment treatment of
BadNet-CF. Heuristic-based pick of θaug is in bold. The
baseline CA as measured by the defender with only Dcleval
is 87.19%
θaug for BadNet-SG θaug for BadNet-LS
BATCH ATK FINE BATCH FINE ATK
CA change (%) −4.9 −4.9 −5.7 −4.4 −6.7 −5.9
ASR change (%) −93.5 −99.0 −69.5 −98.2 −97.4 −100.0
Table 9: Results for pre-deployment treatment of BadNet-SG
and LS variants.
to −100%; i.e., in some settings, the pre-deployment treat-
ment is able to remove the backdoor behavior entirely. These
results appear to support the idea that our pre-deployment
treatment method (and by extension, the post-deployment
method) is broadly applicable in spite of varying attacker
BadNet training hyperparameters.
A.3 Further study of post-deployment
To explore the impact of the chosen θaug’s ASR on post-
deployment treatment, we investigate additional θaug per
BadNet-type to show a "bad" scenario (where θaug has a
relatively high ASR), and a "good" scenario (where θaug has
a relatively low ASR). Table 15 presents the clean accuracy
and attack success rate after applying the post-deployment
treatment to various pre-deployment treated networks. Vari-
ants are taken after pre-deployment treatment and used for
post-deployment treatment (collecting quarantined data), rep-
resenting three scenarios of high, middle, and low ASR, as
well as the model that would have been selected following our
heuristic-based pick. In the High, Mid, and Low ASR variants,
the CPD ratio for post-deployment is 50%. In the Heuristic
Pick case, we use a CPD ratio of 20%. Post-deployment treat-
ment results represent the CA and ASR achieved by retraining
the original BadNet (as specified in Section 4).
A.4 Comparison to Pruning
We apply pruning to BadNet-SG, BadNet-LS, and BadNet-
PN. As the clean accuracy and attack success rate depends
on the amount of pruning, we vary the percentage of neuron
pruning from 0% to 100% and identify points where the clean
16
θaug for BadNet-PN
RAW LR SGD
CA change (%) −5.5 −1.7 −0.3
ASR change (%) −66.0 −87.8 −100.0
Table 10: Results for pre-deployment treatment of BadNet-PN
variants.
Variants
hyperparameter ORIG BATCH ATK FINE
batch size 1283 256 1283 1283
epochs 200 200 200 200
learning rate 1 1 1 0.001
optimizer ADADELTA ADADELTA ADADELTA Adam
preprocessing divide by 255 divide by 255 divide by 255 raw
attack type 3-step 3-step 2-step 3-step
Table 11: BadNet Training Hyperparameters for BadNet-SG
variants.
accuracy or attack success rate is close to that of our fully
treated, heuristic-picked θaug (as reported in Table 3). For
comparable clean accuracy, the attack success rate for the
pruned models vary from 99.98%–99.4%. For comparable
attack success rate (i.e., 0%), the clean accuracy of the pruned
model varies from 0%–17.17%. For all BadNets, pruning is
clearly unable to mitigate backdoor behavior with minimal
clean accuracy degradation.
Variants
hyperparameter ORIG BATCH ATK FINE RAW
batch size 1283 256 1283 1283 1283
epochs 200 200 200 200 200
learning rate 1 1 1 0.001 1
optimizer ADADELTA ADADELTA ADADELTA Adam ADADELTA
preprocessing divide by 255 divide by 255 divide by 255 raw raw
attack type 3-step 3-step 2-step 3-step 3-step
Table 12: BadNet Training Hyper-parameters for BadNet-LS
variants.
Variants
hyperparameter ORIG LR SGD RAW ATK
batch size 32 32 32 32 32
epochs 15 15 15 15 15
learning rate 0.001 0.003 0.01 0.001 0.001
optimizer adam adam SGD adam adam
preprocessing divide by 255 divide by 255 divide by 255 raw divide by 255
attack type 3-step 3-step 3-step 3-step 2-step
Table 13: BadNet Training Hyper-parameters for BadNet-PN
variants.
Original BadNet Treated DNN
Trigger Variant CA (%) ASR (%) CA (%) ASR (%)
SG
BATCH 98.61 99.99 93.81 6.49
ATK 97.35 99.98 92.54 1.01
FINE 97.71 100 92.13 30.47
LS
BATCH 98.12 91.15 93.81 1.6
FINE 96.34 91.4 89.88 2.34
ATK 96.61 91.89 90.91 0
RAW 98.5 90.87 93.08 30.89
PN
LR 92.48 99.96 90.92 12.24
SGD 90.77 82.16 90.53 0
RAW 93.38 99.87 90.64 1.75
ATK 94.56 100 89.01 0
Table 14: Original BadNet and Pre-Deployment Treated DNN
clean data accuracy (CA) and attack success rate (ASR).
Pre-Deploy Treat Post-Deploy Treat (θbd)
Trigger Variant CA. ASR CA. ASR
SG
High ASR 90.6 40.63 94.27 0
Mid ASR 91.01 15.1 94.08 1.13
Low ASR 89.36 4.33 94.23 0
Heuristic Pick 92.29 8.48 92.86 0
LS
High ASR 93.52 9.54 95.6 0
Mid ASR 92.54 3.25 95.58 0
Low ASR 91.13 3.24 96.27 0
Heuristic Pick 93.08 30.89 96.61 7.87
PN
High ASR 95.01 35.62 94.29 0
Mid ASR 90.55 5.36 94.46 0
Low ASR 88.74 0 94.29 0
Heuristic Pick 89.61 2.28 92.96 1.29
CF Heuristic Pick 83.92 24.81 88.52 9.31
Table 15: Pre- and Post-deployment treatment of the BadNets.
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